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This paper suggests that the existing practice of deploying United States Marine Core (USMC) units 
from Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway (MCPP-N) facilities in Trøndelag to other parts 
of Norway during crisis and war needs to be rethought. The operational- and tactical-level threats 
in this area are changing rapidly, and there is a high level of risk inherent in existing practice. We 
propose a concept based on the use of parts of the Norwegian offshore fleet for both operational 
and tactical transport and supply of the USMC. 
 
																																																																																																																																																																																																																																							 										 																																																																																																																																
											 																																						
The	research	project	“Revitalizing	Transatlantic	Maritime	Security:	Filling	Capability	Gaps	with	the	Norwegian	Commercial	Shipping	Sector”	intends	to	bring	forward	creative	ideas	on	how	to	fill	logistical	gaps	by	leveraging	private-public	partnerships	with	merchant	fleet	operators.	 The	 project	 is	 a	 collaboration	 between	 Center	 for	 New	 American	 Security,	Norwegian	 Institiute	of	 International	Affairs	and	 the	Royal	Norwegian	Naval	Academy.	The	project	is	funded	by	a	research	grant	provided	by	the	Norwegian	Ministry	of	Defence.		
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To	 Norway,	 the	 US	 Marine	 Corps	 Prepositioning	Program	 in	 Norway	 (MCPP-N)	 represents	 an	important	 manifestation	 of	 the	 nation’s	 alliance	with	 the	 US.	 It	 is	 a	 pillar	 of	 Norwegian	 defense	policy.	To	the	US,	the	MCPP-N	is	a	forward	base	from	which	 the	 USMC	 can	 support	 operations	 across	Europe	 and	 beyond.	 The	 cost	 of	 the	 program	 is	shared	 equally	 between	 Norway	 and	 the	 US.	 The	MCPP-N	 is	 an	 example	 of	 a	 win-win	 solution	 in	alliance	cooperation.		According	to	the	agreement	on	the	MCPP-N	from	2006,	Norway	is	committed	to	provide	logistic	support	for	deployed	USMC	units:	“the	Government	of	 the	 Kingdom	 of	 Norway	 shall	 make	 available	adequate	 means	 to	 load,	 transport,	 and	 protect	equipment	of	the	MCPP-N	from	Central	Norway	to	mutually	 agreed	 Norwegian	 sea	 or	 air	 ports	 of	embarkation.”	This	is	relevant	for	all	deployments,	even	 if	 the	destination	 is	not	within	Norway.	This	commitment	 appears	 to	 have	 been	 satisfied,	 as	demonstrated	by	many	deployments	to	the	Nordic	region,	the	Baltic,	and	the	Middle	East.		
	
USMC Humvees stored in mountain cave in Frigård, Trøndelag. 
Photo: Torbørn Korsvold 
 But	 the	 agreement	 continues:	 “In	 the	 event	 the	MCPP-N	 is	 used	 to	 reinforce	 Norway,	 the	Government	of	the	Kingdom	of	Norway	shall	make	available	 adequate	 means	 to	 load,	 transport,	 and	protect	 equipment	 of	 the	 MCPP-N,	 as	 well	 as	receive,	 stage	 and	 move	 onward	 personnel	 and	equipment	to	predesignated	areas	within	Norway.”		In	practice,	 this	part	 of	 the	 agreement	has	been	a	“sleeping	paragraph,”	 i.e.,	not	actually	realized.	No	thorough	concept	has	been	exercised	or	tested	on	a	large	scale.	Existing	practice	seem	to	be	that	USMC	units	are	redeployed	on	US	Navy	ships.		In	this	paper,	we	argue	that	existing	practice	should	 be	 replaced	 by	 a	 concept	 based	 on	 assets	
from	 the	 Norwegian	 merchant	 navy	 and	 offshore	industry.	 There	 are	 several	 reasons	 for	 this.	 Our	point	of	departure	is	that	it	is	necessary	to	plan	for	a	 “worst	 case	 scenario.”	 We	 also	 believe	 that	 we	should	train	as	we	fight.	If	the	obligation	cited	above	is	invoked	in	a	crisis,	yet	there	is	no	plan	or	concepts	for	 how	 to	 implement	 it,	 the	 result	 will	 be	suboptimal	 at	 best.	 We	 argue	 that	 a	 feasible	 and	credible	 concept	 should	be	developed,	 tested,	 and	exercised.	In	a	high-intensity	war,	or	in	a	situation	where	 such	 a	 war	 may	 potentially	 occur,	 several	problems	 with	 existing	 practice	 would	 become	evident.		First,	although	we	think	it	is	unlikely	that	a	major	international	crisis	and/or	war	will	break	out	between	Russia	and	Norway,	a	scenario	in	which	it	occurs	elsewhere	and	then	escalates	horizontally	is	far	 more	 likely.	 In	 other	 words,	 a	 war	 in	 the	European	high	north	will	most	likely	result	from	a	much	 larger,	 and	 perhaps	 global,	 confrontation.	 If	so,	then	ships	from	the	US	Navy,	the	Military	Sealift	Command	 (MSC),	 or	 the	 US	 Maritime	Administration	(MARAD)	will	be	needed	elsewhere.	If	implemented,	the	proposals	in	this	paper	will	free	US	capabilities	for	other	theaters	of	war.	Moreover,	if	this	concept	is	tested	and	deemed	credible,	it	may	also	be	 implemented	elsewhere	with	American	or	Norwegian	offshore	assets.		Second,	 existing	 practice	 in	 exercises	 is	 to	bring	very	 large	 ro-ro	 ships	 into	 the	northeastern	part	of	the	Norwegian	Sea.	The	use	of	such	large	Ro-Ro	ships	in	the	Norwegian	Sea	in	a	heightened	crisis	or	major	war	presents	a	very	high	risk.	The	concept	below	 reduces	 that	 risk	 by	 distributing	 the	equipment	 on	 a	 large	 number	 of	 smaller	 ships	capable	of	using	safer	sailing	routes.	The	so-called	“Inner	leads”	is	a	sea	route	through	the	Norwegian	littorals.	 The	 route	 is	 sheltered	 from	 the	 harsh	weather	conditions	of	the	North	Sea	and	Norwegian	Sea.	It	 is	also,	to	a	large	extent,	sheltered	from	the	potentially	 substantial	 submarine	 threat	 in	 the	Norwegian	 Sea.	 The	 Norwegian	 littorals	 are	complex	 and	hard	 to	 navigate.	 But	 by	 using	 ships	and	 crews	 experienced	 in	 sailing	 them,	 a	 large	advantage	is	gained.				Third,	 we	 believe	 that	 in	 a	 confrontation	between	 Russia	 and	 NATO,	 Russia	 has	 few	advantages.	 Among	 these	 advantages	 is	 the	 high	readiness	 of	 Russia’s	 forces,	 a	 sophisticated	 and	highly	mobile	 A2/AD	 capability/capacity,	 and	 the	geographical	distance	between	Russia	and	the	likely	theaters	of	operation.	Russia	cannot	win	a	long	war	with	 NATO.	 To	 win,	 Russia	 would	 need	 to	
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strengthen	 its	 position	 by	 pushing	 forward,	establishing	 a	 faite	 accompli,	 and	 calling	 for	negotiations.	 When	 forward	 A2/AD	 positions	 are	established,	the	cost	for	NATO	to	regain	lost	ground	would	 be	 high.	 To	 handle,	 or	 to	 deter,	 such	 a	scenario,	NATO	would	need	 to	be	able	 to	act	very	quickly.	 In	 Norway’s	 case,	 this	 would	 require	 a	substantial	increase	to	both	the	size	and	readiness	of	Norwegian	forces,	but	also	an	enhanced	ability	to	bring	 in	 allied	 reinforcements	 rapidly	 and	 safely.	The	equipment	stored	in	Norway	represents	a	large	percentage	of	what	a	USMC	force	would	need	to	be	able	to	fight.	But	not	all.		The	remaining	equipment	is	 stored	 on	maritime	 prepositioning	 ships	 of	 the	MSC.		These	ships	are	organized	in	two	squadrons.	One	 is	based	on	Guam,	 the	other	on	Diego	Garcia.		Ships	 from	 Diego	 Garcia	 may	 reach	 Norway	 in	around	two	weeks.		If	the	Suez	channel	is	open.		If	the	 ships	 have	 to	 go	 around	 Africa	 via	 the	 Cape	Route,	which	would	take	approximately	one	month.	If	the	MCPP-N	arrangement	is	to	be	effective	in	war,	such	 a	 solution	 is	 not	 very	 credible.	 The	 problem	could	be	solved	by	storing	similar	equipment	on	the	US	East	Coast.	We	suggest	an	arrangement	whereby	Norwegian	 merchant	 Ro-Ro	 ships	 transport	 the	equipment	 to	 Europe	 in	 a	 crisis.	 We	 believe	 it	 is	possible	 to	 have	 a	 large	 Norwegian	 Ro-Ro	 ship	ready	to	load	on	the	US	East	Coast	within	24	hours,	and	several	such	ships	within	just	a	few	days.	This	part	 of	 the	 concept	 could	 be	 part	 of	 a	 larger	 US–Norwegian	agreement	on	strategic	sealift.				Fourth,	the	agreement	of	2006	states	clearly	that	 it	 is	 Norway’s	 responsibility	 not	 only	 to	transport	USMC	units,	but	also	to	protect	 them	en	route	 to	 their	 destination.	 The	 current	 long-term	plan	 	 decided	 that	 most	 Norwegian	 coastal	 and	littoral	 capabilities	would	be	 terminated	by	2025.	The	 Naval	 Home	 Guard	 is	 already	 dissolved.	 The	coastal	corvettes	are	to	follow	in	2025.	The	Coastal	Rangers	will	lose	all	heavy	organic	weapon	systems.	The	mine	clearing	 force	would	 lose	all	 specialized	vessels,	while	the	number	of	submarines	would	be	reduced	by	 one-third.	However,	 it	was	decided	 to	make	major	 investments	 in	F-35	fighters	(52)	and	P-8	 Poseidon	 maritime	 patrol	 aircraft	 (5).	 In	October	 2019,	 The	 Norwegian	 Chief	 of	 Defense	presented	 his	 advice	 for	 the	 next	 long-term	 plan.	Even	with	 an	 expected	major	 increase	 in	 defense	budgets,	 the	 reduction	 in	 coastal	 capabilities	continues.	In	this	vision,	the	Norwegian	Navy	will	be	much	 stronger	 in	 the	open	 sea,	but	weaker	 in	 the	littorals.	 As	 will	 be	 shown,	 this	 makes	 Norway’s	obligation	 from	2006	to	protect	 the	redeployment	
of	 the	USMC	much	 harder	 to	 fulfill.	 This	 theme	 is	controversial	in	Norway.	We	bring	it	up	here	as	we	strongly	suspect	that	the	choices	are	being	made	as	a	result	of	US	influence,	or	at	least	as	a	result	of	what	the	 Norwegians	 believe	 would	 please	 the	 US.	 A	small	 state	 neighboring	 an	 assertive	 Great	 Power	needs	allies,	 and	accordingly	 the	alliance	with	 the	US	 is	 of	 fundamental	 importance	 to	 Norway.	 We	believe	 that	 the	 US	 should	 have	 expectations	 of	Norway.	But	we	also	believe,	as	did	Admiral	Arleigh	Burke	in	1960,	that	strong	Norwegian	control	of	the	country’s	complex	coastline	is	in	the	best	interest	of	the	US	as	well.		
	
Troops from USMC 1st Recon Battalion and Norwegian  Coastal 
Rangers exercising near Harstad in 2018.. Photo: Jacob Østheim 
Background During	 the	 Cold	 War,	 the	 Norwegian	 defense	concept	 depended	 on	 the	 mobilization	 of	 some	seven	 percent	 of	 the	 population.	 Less	 than	 10	percent	 of	 the	 Norwegian	 population	 lives	 in	 the	three	northernmost	counties,	from	south	to	north:	Nordland,	 Troms,	 and	 Finmark.	 If	 the	 Cold	 War	turned	hot,	the	Norwegians	assumed	that	the	Soviet	Union’s	 forces	would	cross	 the	border	 in	Finmark	and	 march	 through	 the	 relatively	 flat	 county.	Several	 brigades	 from	 Southern	 Norway	 stored	their	equipment	in	Troms,	the	mountainous	second-northernmost	county,	 in	order	to	facilitate	a	rapid	increase	 in	 the	 forces	 there.	 The	 troops	would	 be	flown	to	airfields	in	the	north	to	join	up	with	their	equipment.	 The	 distance	 between	 Troms	 and	 the	more	densely	populated	areas	in	the	south	was	one	reason	 for	 this	 arrangement.	 Another	 reason,	 as	discussed	 below,	 is	 the	 particular	 challenges	 of	Norwegian	 geography.	 In	 Troms,	 the	 Norwegians	could	 make	 their	 stand.	 The	 Norwegian	 strategy	was	 simply	 to	 hold	 until	 allied	 reinforcements	arrived.	
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When	 Norway	 joined	 NATO	 as	 a	 founding	member	 in	 1949,	 the	 Norwegians	 had	 certain	reservations.	 Hoping	 to	 avoid	 increased	 tension	between	 the	Soviet	Union	and	NATO	 in	 the	north,	neither	Norway	nor	Denmark	wanted	allied	bases	on	 their	 soil.	 Both	 recognized,	 however,	 that	 they	would	need	allied	reinforcements	in	war.	One	of	the	most	 important	 lessons	 from	 the	 campaign	 in	Norway	 in	 1940	 was	 that	 allied	 reinforcements	would	 have	 to	 come	 prepared	 to	 fight	 in	 the	Norwegian	topography	and	climate.	Therefore,	the	Norwegians	 worked	 hard	 in	 NATO	 to	 convince	allied	 states	 to	 participate	 in	 exercises	 in	Norway	and	 to	 earmark	 units	 for	 the	 reinforcement	 of	Norway	 in	 war.	 Several	 allies,	 including	 the	 UK,	Canada,	 and	 Germany,	 agreed	 to	 store	 equipment	for	 earmarked	 forces	 in	 Norway.	 The	 agreements	made	 with	 the	 US,	 though,	 were	 by	 far	 the	 most	important.		Practical	 solutions	 pertaining	 to	 military	cooperation	between	the	US	and	Norway	have	often	been	 worked	 out	 at	 the	 service	 level.	 During	 the	Cold	War,	both	the	US	Air	Force	and	the	US	Navy	had	arrangements	 whereby	 fuel	 and	 ammunition	 for	ships	and	aircraft	were	stored	at	Norwegian	bases.	The	 COB-agreement1	 	 between	 the	 USAF	 and	Norway	 included	nine	 prepared	 air	 bases	 for	 170	combat	aircraft.	After	successive	cuts	during	the	last	few	 decades,	 the	 agreement	 now	 covers	 two	 air	bases.	The	Invictus	agreement	is	still	in	force,	but	it	is	reduced	in	scope.	It	covers	support	for	US	Navy	ships,	 including	 carrier	 groups,	 and	 for	 maritime	patrol	aircraft	from	several	air	bases.		The	most	important	agreement	between	the	US	 and	 Norway	 on	 this	 level	 was	 made	 in	 its	primary	 form	 in	 1981.	 Originally	 named	 the	“Norway	 Air	 Landed	 Marine	 Expeditionary	Program	(NALMEB),”	this	agreement	was	intended	to	 provide	 prestored	 equipment	 for	 a	 full	 USMC	brigade	 with	 13,000	 troops	 and	 a	 substantial	 air	wing.	Since	 it	was	assumed	that	 in	a	war	between	NATO	and	the	Soviet	Union,	the	latter	would	use	its	substantial	submarine	fleet	to	disrupt	transatlantic	sea	 lines	 of	 communication,	 Norway	 needed	 to	ensure	 that	 reinforcements	 would	 arrive	 quickly.	That	 would	 only	 be	 possible	 if	 the	 requisite	equipment	 was	 safely	 stored	 in	 Norway,	 and	 if	troops	could	be	brought	in	with	aircraft.		Trøndelag,	 in	mid-Norway,	was	 chosen	 for	two	 reasons.	 The	 first	 was	 about	 politics.	 The	Norwegians	 did	 not	 want	 to	 provoke	 the	 Soviet	Union	by	placing	allied	troops	close	to	the	border.	The	second	reason	was	about	security	as	a	military	
principle.	 It	 was	 important	 that	 the	 prestored	equipment	was	located	in	an	area	that	would	not	be	overrun	 by	 the	 enemy	 in	 the	 first	 days	 of	 war.	However,	this	solution	had	certain	drawbacks.	
Geography Norway	 is	 known	 as	 a	 land	 of	mountains.	 This	 is	true,	 as	 less	 than	 one-third	 of	 the	 land	 lies	 below	300	 meters	 above	 sea	 level,	 while	 more	 than	 20	percent	of	the	terrain	is	above	900	meters	above	sea	level.	But	more	than	anything,	Norway	is	a	coastline.	The	 coastline	 of	 the	 mainland	 measures	 29,750	kilometers.	 But	 Norway	 also	 has	 239,057	 islands	and	islets	and	81,192	rocks	and	reefs.	When	these	are	 counted,	 the	 coastline	 stretches	 for	 102,937	kilometers.	The	coastline	of	Nordland	county	alone	measures	 26,906	 kilometers.	 It	 thus	 follows	 that	this	 type	of	 topography	presents	multiple	ways	 to	hide	and	is	therefore	difficult	to	control.				
		 In	naval	theory,	the	possession	of	a	strategic	position	 may	 provide	 large	 advantages.	 In	 the	maritime	domain,	a	strategic	position	may	provide	access	to	the	open	ocean	or	increase	the	capacity	to	deny	the	enemy	such	access.	After	the	First	World	War,	 German	 naval	 theorist	 Wolfgang	 Wegener	wrote	that	 if	Germany	had	controlled	Norway,	the	Royal	Navy	would	not	have	been	able	 to	deny	 the	German	fleet	access	to	the	high	seas.	Twenty	years	
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later,	the	Germans	actually	controlled	Norway	and	used	 its	 strategic	 position	 to	 support	 the	 U-boat	campaign	 in	 the	Atlantic	 and	 to	 attack	 convoys	 in	the	 Barents	 Sea.2	 To	 some	 extent,	 the	 present	Russian	position	mirrors	that	of	Germany	 in	1914	and	1939.	Access	by	the	Baltic	and	Black	Sea	fleets	to	 the	 open	 sea	 may	 easily	 be	 blocked	 at	chokepoints	in	the	Bosporus	and	Danish	straits.	The	Northern	 fleet’s	 position	 is	 better,	 but	 it	 is	vulnerable	 in	 the	 gap	 between	 the	 North	 Cape	 in	Norway	and	the	Svalbard	archipelago.	Possession	of	parts	 of	 the	 Norwegian	 coastline	 would	 greatly	enhance	the	strategic	position	of	the	Russian	Navy.	If	 so,	 then	 the	 vulnerability	 of	 all	 NATO	 states	 in	Northwestern	 Europe	 would	 increase.	 The	 same	would	 be	 true	 for	 the	 transatlantic	 sea	 lines	 of	communication.	
Perspective on the Littorals Generally	speaking,	littorals	are	areas	where	the	sea	and	 land	 meet	 each	 other.	 There	 is,	 however,	 no	single	 definition	 of	 the	 littoral	 area.	 In	 traditional	military	 definitions,	 the	 littorals	 are	 areas	 where	weapons	from	land	can	reach	targets	at	sea	and	vice	versa.	Obviously,	with	the	vastly	increased	reach	of	missiles,	 this	 definition	 loses	 all	 value	 as	 an	analytical	tool.		From	 an	 amphibious	 point	 of	 view,	 the	littoral	zone	is	a	barrier	that	the	landing	force	must	cross	to	get	from	the	sea	to	their	objectives	on	land.	Historically,	 landings	 on	defended	 coastlines	 have	been	 very	 bloody	 affairs.	 Therefore,	 amphibious	forces	 like	 the	 USMC	 have	 developed	 operational	concepts	 whereby	 the	 troops	 are	 brought	 to	 the	vicinity	 of	 their	 objectives	 by	 large	 ships.	 From	these	 ships,	 at	 least	 the	 first	 waves	 of	 troops	 are	brought	 to	 land	with	 helicopters	 or	VTOL	 aircraft	like	 the	 Osprey.	 Heavy	 material,	 like	 armored	vehicles,	 still	 need	 to	 be	 brought	 ashore	 with	smaller	 vessels,	 so-called	 “connectors.”	Alternatively,	if	the	force	controls	a	port,	the	ships	may	simply	dock,	and	the	material	can	roll	off	from	the	ship	to	the	quay.		The	Norwegian	 littorals	 are	 complex,	with	deep	fjords	surrounded	by	steep	mountains.	There	are	 more	 than	 300	 000	 islands,	 islets,	 reefs,	 and	rocks.	This	makes	radar	far	less	efficient	than	in	the	open	sea.	It	is	difficult	to	find	a	small	vessel	hiding	in	the	littorals.	Even	if	such	vessels	are	found,	most	anti-ship	missiles,	like	the	Harpoon,	use	active	radar	homing.	 Such	 missiles	 are	 seldom	 able	 to	distinguish	 between	 a	 vessel	 and	 an	 islet.	 The	littorals	 are	different	under	water,	 too.	 Cold	 fresh	
water	from	the	mountains	mixes	with	the	warmer	saltwater	of	the	Gulf	Stream.	This	creates	layers	in	the	 sea	 with	 different	 temperatures	 and	 salinity,	which	 poses	 a	 challenge	 to	 sonar.	 Complicating	matters	further	is	that	submariners	who	know	their	way	around	these	waters	are	very	difficult	to	find.	Anti-submarine	warfare	(ASW)	in	these	littorals	is	very	different	from	that	in	the	open	sea.			
	
USS Iwo ima (LHD-7) and RNoN Storm in exercise Trident Juncture 
2018. Photo: Bendik Storli. 	Therefore,	a	small	ship	or	submarine	hiding	in	the	littorals	may,	if	it	has	the	proper	target	data	and	 its	 missiles	 have	 adequate	 range,	 hit	 and	destroy	a	ship	in	the	open	sea.	Open	sea	ships	will	struggle	to	find	the	hiding	vessel,	and	their	missiles	will	rarely	be	effective.	This	means	that	the	littorals	may	be	used	as	a	force	multiplier	that	allows	small	and	 relatively	 simple	 combatants	 to	 defeat	 more	powerful	 opponents.	 However,	 operations	 in	 the	littorals	 are	 difficult	 and	 extremely	 risky.	Operational	 crews	 must	 have	 the	 requisite	knowledge	 and	 experience	 to	 navigate	 there.	Sufficient	training	and	exercises	are	thus	crucial.	Since	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 Royal	Norwegian	Navy	in	1814,	there	has	been	a	more	or	less	 constant	 debate	 on	whether	 the	 navy	 should	prioritize	 the	 high	 seas	 or	 the	 littorals.	 In	 some	periods,	 the	Norwegians	 invested	heavily	 in	a	 few	large	ocean-going	ships,	while	other	periods	were	dominated	by	the	procurement	of	large	numbers	of	coastal	 craft.	 During	 the	 Cold	 War,	 the	 burden-sharing	arrangements	between	the	US	Navy	and	its	allies,	both	in	Europe	and	Asia,	allowed	the	US	Navy	to	 focus	 mainly	 on	 the	 high	 seas,	 as	 the	 allies	designed	 their	 navies	 to	 be	 able	 to	 handle	 tasks	closer	 to	 shore.	 After	 the	 Second	World	War,	 the	Norwegian	Navy	had	many	frigates	and	destroyers	that	had	operated	 integrated	with	 the	Royal	Navy	
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during	 the	 war.	 As	 these	 ships	 grew	 old	 and	 the	Russian	Northern	Fleet	grew	in	strength	during	the	Cold	War,	Norway	and	the	US	worked	out	a	plan	for	a	 new	 Norwegian	 Navy,	 which	 would	 comprise	 a	force	 with	 almost	 50	 fast-attack	 craft,	 15	 small	submarines,	 and	 a	 handful	 of	 small	 frigates	 for	coastal	 escort	 tasks.	 The	 Coastal	 Artillery,	 with	some	40	fortresses	with	heavy	guns,	torpedoes,	and	minefields,	was	part	of	that	navy.	This	littoral	navy	was	 created	 with	 substantial	 and	 generous	 US	financial	 support.	 It	would	not	have	been	realized	without	 the	 full	 support	 of	 the	US	Navy’s	 Chief	 of	Naval	 Operations,	 Admiral	 Arleigh	 Burke.3		Presumably,	 Admiral	 Burke,	 with	 his	 experience	from	World	War	ll	and	the	Korean	War,	understood	the	importance	of	strategic	positions.	Such	a	coastal	force	would	be	able	to	stop	amphibious	landings	in	Norway,	but	it	would	also	deny	the	powerful	Soviet	Navy	 the	 advantage	 of	 operating	 from	 the	Norwegian	 coast	 against	Western	 Europe	 and	 the	Atlantic.		
	
Narrow waters. Skjold-class coastal corvette RNoN Skudd in 
Northern Norway 2016. Photo: Johan Ludvig Holst. 
The Opposing Forces The	Norwegian	Navy	has	a	small	littoral	force	with	six	 corvettes,	 six	 submarines,	 four	 mine-clearing	vessels,	 and	 a	 company-sized	 coastal	 ranger	 unit.	The	ocean-going	fleet	consists	of	one	oiler/logistic	replenishment	ship	and	four	frigates.	Present	plans	call	for	an	increase	in	the	number	of	frigates,	much	larger	 submarines,	 and	 a	 reduction	 of	 the	 littoral	force.	 In	other	words,	 the	Norwegian	Navy	will	be	stronger	in	the	open	sea	and	weaker	in	the	littorals.			As	for	Russia,	the	following	changes	have	occurred:			•	 The	Northern	 Fleet	 is	 now	 the	 core	 of	 the	Russian	Arctic	Joint	Command,	in	practice	a	fifth	 military	 district.	 It	 is	 the	 only	 joint	
command	led	by	an	admiral.	Obviously,	the	Russians	 view	 the	 Arctic	 as	 a	 maritime	theater	of	operations.		•	 An	 increase	 in	 Russia’s	 potential	 to	 use	hybrid	tactics	to	disrupt,	delay,	and	possibly	deny	activity	in	the	waters	around	Norway.	This	 includes	 jamming,	 sabotage,	 and	 the	use	 of	 civilian	 shipping	 for	 irregular	activities,	such	as	mine-laying.		•	 An	 increase	 in	Russia’s	ability	 for	denial	 in	the	air	and	at	sea	as	air	defense	and	coastal	defense	 units	 are	 modernized	 and	expanded.	 Land-based	 systems	 are	 highly	mobile	and	may	be	moved	by	air	and	by	sea	to	 forward	 strategic	 positions	 to	 deny	 an	opponent	access	to	a	large	area.	•	 The	 ground	 forces	 of	 the	 Arctic	 Command	remain	 relatively	 few.	 But	 all	 brigades	exercise	amphibious	operations.			•	 An	 expected	 increase	 in	 the	 number	 of	conventional	 submarines	 (diesel	 and	possibly	 AIP)	 in	 the	Northern	 Fleet	within	the	next	few	years.	If	so,	we	can	expect	the	Russian	ability	for	denial	in	the	open	ocean	close	to	Norway	to	increase	as	well.		•	 An	expected	change	in	the	order	of	battle	of	the	Russian	Northern	Fleet,	one	which	will	result	 in	 a	 relatively	 weaker	 blue-water	Navy,	but	a	strengthened	green-	and	brown-water	 force.	 If	 so,	we	can	expect	a	Russian	attempt	to	utilize	the	Norwegian	littorals	as	a	force	multiplier	for	their	coastal	fleet.			Presently,	 the	 Norwegians	 are	 getting	 stronger	 at	sea	 but	weaker	 in	 the	 littorals,	while	 the	 Russian	fleet	is	going	in	the	opposite	direction.			
Deployment to the North The	challenge	at	hand	is	to	bring	USMC	units	safely	from	the	Trøndelag	area,	where	their	equipment	is	stored,	to	Northern	Norway.	Northern	Norland	and	Troms	are	presumably	the	most	relevant	regions.		The	 MCPP-N	 arrangement	 is	 not	 meant	 to	 be	exclusively	 for	 the	 reinforcement	 of	 Norway.	 Our	proposals	 are	meant	 to	make	 a	 deployment	 from	Trøndelag	safer	and	more	secure.	But	the	concepts	presented	 here	 could	 also	 be	 used	 elsewhere.	 In	terms	of	value,	the	Norwegian	offshore	fleet	is	only	matched	by	 that	of	 the	Americans.	 If	 the	concepts	presented	 here	 actually	 work	 in	 Norwegian	conditions,	they	are	likely	to	work	anywhere.		
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We	 propose	 using	 part	 of	 the	 Norwegian	offshore	fleet	to	transport	and	supply	units	from	the	USMC	operating	in	Norway.	In	war,	Norwegian	law	allows	the	state	to	requisition	all	the	assets	it	wants.	We	do	not,	however,	recommend	such	a	practice.	If	the	proposed	concept	is	to	work,	it	requires	the	full	cooperation	of	shipowners	and	their	crews.	 It	will	require	 testing,	 exercising,	 and	 training	as	well	 as	the	preparation	of	some	equipment	for	the	ships	in	peacetime	 if	 the	 concept	 is	 to	 work	 in	 war.	Therefore,	 cooperation	 between	 the	 Norwegian	state	 and	 shipowners	would	 have	 to	 be	 based	 on	contracts.	The	state	and	the	shipowners	would	have	to	agree	on	when	to	run	exercises	so	 that	 they	do	not	 conflict	with	attractive	business	opportunities	for	 the	 latter.	 The	 shipowners	 and	 their	 crews	would	 have	 to	 accept	 a	 vetting	 process	 that	approves	 the	 members	 of	 the	 crew	 for	 security	clearance.	 Perhaps	 some	 kind	 of	 reserve	arrangement	 could	 be	 established,	 whereby	companies	would	be	compensated	for	extra	costs	if	a	 certain	 percentage	 of	 the	 crew	 were	 part	 of	 a	reserve	 force?	 Such	 issues	 need	 to	 be	 negotiated.	Our	main	concern	here	is	to	outline	a	concept	that	may	 be	 advantageous	 on	 the	 operational	 and	tactical	level.		Presently,	 the	 MCPP-N	 arrangement	includes	 prestored	 equipment	 for	 an	 infantry	battalion	 task	 force,	 a	 combat	 logistics	 battalion,	and	 a	 composite	 aviation	 squadron.	 The	 total	number	 of	 personnel	 supported	 is	 in	 the	 3000–5000	range.	This	represents	a	force	a	bit	larger	than	
a	 normal	Marine	 Expeditionary	Unit,	which	 is	 the	smallest	 air–ground	 task	 force	 (MAGTF)	 in	 the	USMC.	 However,	 the	 number	 of	 stored	 howitzers	and	 tanks	 is	 larger	 than	 in	 a	 normal	 MEU.4	 The	number	 of	Humvees	 is	much	 larger.	 There	 are	no	aircraft	 or	 helicopters	 stored,	 although	 the	 heavy	equipment	 needed	 for	 the	 support	 of	 aviation	operations	 is.	 While	 the	 MEU	 is	 deployed	 on	amphibious	 assault	 ships,	 the	 personnel	 of	 the	MCPP-N	force	will	be	flown	to	Norway	and	join	up	with	the	prestored	equipment.5					Any	 transport	 from	 Southern	 Norway	 to	Northern	Norway	may	choose	between	air,	sea,	and	land	routes—or	a	combination	of	these.	In	war,	as	well	 as	 in	 a	 heightened	 crisis	 in	 which	 hybrid	methods	 are	 used	 against	 Norway,	 each	 of	 these	routes	faces	different	threats.	In	a	pre-war	scenario,	all	the	routes	may	be	used.	However,	in	a	crisis	with	heightened	 tensions,	 one	 should	 expect	 diverse	“hybrid”	 activities	 that	may	disrupt	 and	delay	 the	deployment.	In	a	shooting	war,	any	deployment	will	face	multiple	threats.		If	 Swedish	 territory	 is	 included,	 there	 are	several	land	routes.	There	is	only	one	option	if	the	transport	 uses	 exclusively	 Norwegian	 territory,	European	 route	 6,	 or	 E-6.	 From	 Trøndelag	 to	Eastern	 Finnmark,	 E-6	 stretches	 1646	 kilometers.	Through	 Nordland	 county	 alone,	 it	measures	 632	kilometers.	 The	 route	 is	 very	 vulnerable,	 with	ferries,	 numerous	 tunnels,	 and	 bridges.	 Many	stretches	 of	 road	 are	 exposed	 to	 mudslides,	rockslides,	 or	 avalanches.	 One	 does	 not	 need	 a	
USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) and Skjold class coastal corvette in Northern Norway 2018. Photo: Norwegian Armed Forces. 
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particularly	vivid	imagination	to	design	an	effective	sabotage	 that	will	 disrupt	 and	 delay	 a	 large	 force	moving	northward.		There	 are	 many	 airfields	 in	 Northern	Norway.	 Transport	 of	 heavy	 military	 equipment	depends	 on	 the	 availability	 of	 heavy	 lift	 aircraft.	Norway	does	not	have	such	aircraft.	Presumably,	in	a	 serious	 international	 crisis,	 USAF	 capability	will	be	needed	to	support	a	range	of	operations.	All	the	northern	airfields	are	well	within	range	of	different	Russian	 missile	 systems.	 There	 is	 no	 area	 air	defense,	 and	 only	 very	 limited	 point	 defense,	capability	in	the	Norwegian	armed	forces.	There	is	reason	 to	 believe,	 however,	 that	 such	 capabilities	will	be	procured	in	the	near	future.6	Nevertheless,	due	 to	 the	 strong	 increase	 in	 Russian	 long-range	precision	 strike	 capabilities,	 it	 is	 unlikely	 that	Norway	will	be	able	to	guarantee	full	availability	for	these	 airfields	 in	 war.	 For	 the	 same	 reason,	Norwegian	and	allied	forces	cannot	count	on	full	air	superiority	all	the	time.			At	sea,	 there	are	two	very	different	routes,	one	in	the	open	sea	and	another	through	the	leads.	The	 latter	 is	 the	 littoral	 route,	 protected	 from	 the	weather	by	islands.	In	the	open	sea,	transport	ships	will,	 generally,	 be	 safe	 from	mines.	 However,	 the	ships	 will	 be	 more	 exposed	 to	 threats	 from	submarines	 and	 aircraft	 as	 well	 as	 from	 surface	vessels.	The	Russian	Northern	Fleet’s	strongest	card	is	its	submarine	fleet.	At	the	Royal	Norwegian	Naval	Academy,	we	expect	the	Northern	Fleet	to	increase	the	number	of	diesel-electric	submarines,	perhaps	with	AIP,	within	the	next	few	years.7				The	 leads	are	much	better	 suited	 for	mine	warfare,	 provided	 that	 the	 mines	 are	 covertly	deployed.	 This	 may	 be	 done	 by	 aircraft	 and	submarines,	but	also	by	civilian	ships.	It	is	possible	to	 threaten	 shipping	 in	 the	 leads	 directly	 with	submarines,	 but	 the	 risk	 for	 the	 submarines	 is	considerably	greater	than	it	is	in	the	open	sea.			Recent	 practice	 is	 for	 the	 USMC	 to	 deploy	northward	 from	 Trøndelag	 on	 US	 Navy	 ships.	 In	October	 2018,	 the	 USNS	 1st	 Lt	 Baldomero	 Lopez,	from	 Maritime	 Prepositioning	 Squadron	 Two	 at	Diego	 Garcia,	 brought	 M1A1	 Abrams	 tanks	 from	Trøndelag	to	Troms	county.	Inside	a	fjord,	the	Lopez	unloaded	tanks	and	other	vehicles	with	cranes	via	an	 Improved	 Navy	 Lighterage	 System.	 The	capability	to	unload	at	sea	without	a	transfer	dock	was	successfully	demonstrated.		In	 a	 wartime	 scenario,	 this	 practice	 is	problematic	for	two	reasons.	First,	there	may	not	be	available	ships.	They	may	be	busy	elsewhere,	or	the	
voyage	 from	 bases	 in	 Diego	 Garcia	 or	 Guam	may	simply	 take	 too	 long	 for	 such	 an	 option	 to	 be	practical.		Second,	ships	like	the	Lopez	will	not	be	able	to	 use	 the	 inner	 leads,	 at	 least	 not	 for	 the	 whole	voyage.	 Although	 among	 the	 smaller	 maritime	prepositioning	 ships,	 the	 Lopez	 (1985)	 is	 a	 large	vessel	 with	 a	 length	 off	 205	 meters	 (673	 feet),	 a	beam	of	32	meters	 (106	 feet),	 and	a	draft	 of	nine	meters	(29.5	feet).	Such	large	ro-ro	ships	cannot	sail	through	the	leads.	In	an	area	in	which	there	is	likely	to	be	 enemy	 submarines,	 the	 risk	 in	 the	open	 sea	may	 be	 unacceptable.	 The	 present	 peacetime	practice	 is	 to	 move	 the	 equipment	 of	 a	 full	 army	brigade	 from	 CONUS	 to	 Europe	 on	 one	 or	 a	 few	ships.	 If	 this	 is	 done	 in	 a	 USMC	 deployment	 from	Trøndelag	 to	 Troms,	 the	 whole	 force	 may	 be	destroyed	by	a	single	torpedo	or	a	single	missile.		
	
The USNS 1st Lt. Baldomero Lopez (T-AK 3010) offload to an 
Improved Navy Lighterage System (INLS) during exercise Northern 
Screen in Bogen, Norway, October 2018. Photo: US Navy by 
Kenneth Gardner 	Third,	unloading	with	a	lighterage	system	is	a	useful	but	slow	process.	A	ship	of	this	size	laying	completely	still	in	a	fjord	for	a	long	time	may	very	well	be	exposed	to	random	threats.	It	is	simply	too	large	to	hide,	too	tempting	an	opportunity,	and	too	large	a	target	to	miss.	This	practice	would	be	very	dangerous	in	a	contested	area.		Our	 proposal	 is	 to	 exploit	 Norway’s	 large	offshore	fleet	and	its	fleet	of	smaller,	regional	ro-ro	ships.	The	latter	are	small	enough	to	use	the	inner	leads—and	importantly,	their	crews	sail	these	leads	every	day,	all	year	round.	 	Norwegian	shipowners	control	a	total	fleet	of	almost	600	offshore	vessels.	This	 fleet	 is	 composed	 of	 platform	 supply	 vessels	(PSVs),	 anchor	 handling	 tug	 supply	 vessels	(AHTSVs),	and	more	specialized	crane	vessels	and	offshore	 construction	 vessels.	 PSVs	 and	 AHTSVs,	here	grouped	together	as	offshore	support	vessels	(OSVs),	may	serve	as	connectors	for	both	the	USMC	and	 the	 Norwegian	 Army,	 while	 other	 ship	categories	may	be	valuable	in	other	roles.		The	offshore	support	vessels	typically	have	a	length	of	80–90	meters	(262–295	feet),	a	breadth	
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of	18–22	meters	(59–72	feet),	and	a	draft	of	around	6–9	meters	(19–29	feet).8	They	can	carry	a	load	of	around	 4000–6000	 tons,	 including	 a	 deck	 load	 of	between	1500	and	2500	tons.	The	deck	strength	is	normally	10–12	tons	per	square	meter.	Most	have	multiple	 thrusters	 (Bow-stern-azimuth),	 making	the	 ships	 highly	 maneuverable	 and	 very	 stable.	They	have	multiple	tanks	for	fuel,	water,	and	special	liquids.	 Crews	 are	 normally	 between	 25	 and	 60	persons.	Some	have	powerful	winches	and	cranes.	Some	have	moonpools	and	embarked	ROVs.	Some	have	helicopter	decks.	Most	PSVs	have	limited	space	for	 accommodation,	 while	 AHTVs	 typically	 have	more.			
	
In September 2019, the AHTS Boa Jarl and her sister ship were hired 
to serve with the Norwegian Coast Guard for five years. The ships 
are 91 meters long, 22 meters wide and can carry a load of 3790t. 
They have a deck area of 828 square meters, max deck load is 1600 
tons, deck strength is up to 15 tons per square meters. Photo: 
Skipsrevyen. 	 In	the	USMC,	connectors	are	needed	to	bring	troops,	equipment,	and	supplies	from	the	sea	to	the	shore,	normally	a	relatively	short	distance.	We	see	a	potential	for	using	PSVs	and	AHTSVs	as	long-range	connectors	 in	 a	 concept	 whereby	 each	 battalion	
landing	 team	 is	 granted	 control	 of	 several	 OSVs.	These	 vessels	 have	 multiple	 tanks	 for	 many	categories	 of	 fuel	 as	 well	 as	 for	 water.	 They	 also	have	a	large	deck	area.	The	decks	are	strengthened,	particularly	 in	 the	 AHTSVs,	 for	 very	 heavy	 loads.	The	AHTSVs	 are	well	 equipped	with	winches	 and	cranes.	 The	 ships	 could	 bring	 foldable	 bridges,	packed	in	40-foot	containers	and	quickly	assembled	with	a	crane.	Such	bridges	could	link	ships	to	shore,	but	also	to	other	ships	or	barges.	This	would	make	a	 landing	 possible	 almost	 anywhere.	 The	 force	would	not	have	to	depend	on	ports	or	beaches.	Each	battalion	landing	team	would	then	be	able	to	bring	its	troops,	its	logistics	combat	element,	and	substantial	supplies	directly	to	its	assigned	area	of	operations.	If	needed,	the	ships	could	stay	in	that	AO	 as	 logistical	 bases.	 Alternatively,	 they	 could	return	south	to	bring	in	more	supplies.	
Atlantic Sealift and Seabasing MCPP-N	 can	 also	 support	 a	 much	 larger	 force,	 a	Marine	 Expeditionary	 Brigade	 (MEB)	 with	munitions	 for	 30	 days.	 An	 MEB	 consists	 of	 a	reinforced	 infantry	regiment	(the	equivalent	of	an	army	 brigade),	 a	 combat	 logistics	 regiment,	 a	composite	aircraft	group,	and	a	command	element.	If	 an	MEB	 is	deployed,	most	of	 its	 equipment	will	have	to	be	brought	in	either	by	amphibious	assault	ships,	maritime	prepositioning	ships,	or	large	ro-ro	vessels	of	the	MARAD	strategic	lift	fleet	from	the	US.	In	 a	 large	 crisis	 or	war,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 US	 forces	would	be	needed	 in	 several	 theaters	of	operation.	Amphibious	assault	ships,	MPS,	and	US	strategic	lift	capabilities	 will	 be	 in	 high	 demand.	 If	 a	 larger	MAGTF	 should	 deploy	 to	 Norway,	 the	 equipment	will	have	to	be	shipped	in.	The	equipment	stored	in	Norway	 represents	 a	 large—but	 not	 maximum—percentage	of	what	a	USMC	force	would	need	to	be	able	to	fight.		
The Tec-Trans container based Smartbridge is 20-32 meters long, 4 meters wide and built for loads over 100 tons. Photo: Tec-Trans 
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The	 maritime	 prepositioning	 ships	 of	 the	MSC	are	organized	into	two	squadrons:	one	is	based	off	Guam	in	the	Pacific,	while	the	other	is	stationed	off	Diego	Garcia	in	the	Indian	Ocean.	The	squadron	in	 European	 waters	 was	 disestablished	 in	 2012.	Ships	 from	 Diego	 Garcia	 may	 reach	 Norway	 in	around	two	weeks—if	the	Suez	Canal	is	open.	If	not,	then	the	ships	would	have	to	circumnavigate	Africa	via	the	Cape	Route,	which	would	take	one	month.	If	the	MCPP-N	arrangement	is	to	be	effective	in	war,	such	a	solution	is	not	very	credible.	We	suggest	that	the	US	and	Norway	should	look	into	the	possibility	of	storing	similar	equipment	on	the	US	East	Coast.	Further,	 we	 suggest	 an	 arrangement	 whereby	Norwegian	 Ro-Ro	 ships	 are	 contracted	 and	earmarked	 to	bring	 the	equipment	 to	Europe	 in	a	crisis.	Such	a	concept	could	be	part	of	a	larger	US–Norwegian	agreement	on	strategic	sealift.9		The	US	Navy	and	the	USMC	have	developed	the	Seabasing	concept	for	almost	two	decades.	The	concept	 is	 primarily	 intended	 for	 operations	 in	which	there	are	no	or	few	available	bases	on	land.	This	will	not	be	the	case	in	Norway.	But	in	the	era	of	hybrid	 warfare	 and	 long-range	 precision-guided	munitions,	 permanent	 bases	 and	 harbors	 are	vulnerable.	 All	 harbors,	 and	 their	 approaches,	 are	exposed	to	enemy	mines,	sabotage,	and	long-range	missiles,	as	well	as	to	classic	bomber	raids.		It	may	be	possible,	and	preferable,	to	choose	one	harbor	to	use	as	a	hub	from	which	troops	and	supplies	may	be	distributed	to	the	field.	It	may	well	be	 possible	 to	 protect	 one	 or	more	 harbors	 from	most	 threats.	 But	 if	 so,	 this	 harbor	will	 become	 a	point	 of	 gravity,	 a	 schwerpunkt,	 for	 the	 whole	operation.	This,	of	course,	 invites	an	enemy	attack	of	some	magnitude.	While	in	some	cases,	it	may	be	desirable	to	choose	to	fight	a	battle	of	attrition	in	an	area	 of	 one’s	 own	 choosing,	 this	 would	 compel	Norwegian	and	US	forces	to	deploy	a	large	share	of	their	 forces	 in	 defensive	 positions	 and	 would	consequently	 leave	 the	 initiative	 to	 the	 enemy.	 If	such	 a	 point	 of	 gravity	 is	 destroyed,	 then	 the	campaign	is	likely	to	collapse.		The	 investment	 in	 the	 Seabasing	 concept	seem	 to	 be	 limited	 to	 the	 Pacific.	 We	 suggest,	however,	 that	 some	parts	of	 the	 concept	 could	be	tested	 in	 Norwegian	 waters	 with	 contracted	 or	mobilized	 civilian	 resources.	 The	 Expeditionary	transfer	 docks	 (previously	 known	 as	 Mobile	Landing	Platforms)	where	ro-ro	ships	will	transfer	
their	loads	to	tactical	connectors	are	basically	semi-submersible	 ships	 configured	 to	 function	 as	 a	mobile	 harbor.	 Norwegian	 shipowners	 control	some	such	heavy	lift	semi-submersible	ships,	which	could	be	modified	 to	 transfer	docks,	but	 they	also	possess	many	very	large	barges	that	could	take	on	the	same	role.	We	propose	using	heavy	barges	to	establish	temporary,	 moveable	 harbors	 to	 which	 strategic	sealift	 ships	 or	 similar	 vessels	 may	 transfer	 their	goods	 to	 other	 vessels	 serving	 as	 connectors	 or	directly	to	shore	via	temporary	bridges.	In	war,	one	must	assume	that	the	enemy’s	ability	to	locate	and	target	 mobile	 assets	 will	 be	 diminished,	 whereas	the	 location	 of	 permanent	 harbors	 is	 obviously	always	 known.	 	 Therefore,	 moveable	 harbors,	operating	in	or	close	to	the	littorals,	may	be	able	to	hide.	
Summary This	 paper	 proposes	 several	 concepts	 that	 would	enable	a	safer	and	smarter	redeployment	of	USMC	forces	 northward	 from	 storage	 areas	 in	 Central	Norway	 in	 case	 of	 war	 or	 heightened	 crisis.	 The	concepts	 will	 provide	 enhanced	 operational	 and	tactical	 mobility	 and	 facilitate	 more	 effective	logistics	 in	 a	 challenging	 area	 of	 operations.	 We	believe	these	concepts	are	feasible,	but	they	need	to	be	 tested	 and	 developed.	 According	 to	 the	agreement	 of	 2006,	 Norway	 is	 responsible	 for	moving	 and	 protecting	 the	 USMC	 force	 within	Norway.	 The	 presented	 concepts	 should	 build	 on	contracts	 between	 Norwegian	 authorities	 and	shipowners.	They	should	be	exercised	regularly.		The	 concepts	 are	 built	 around	 the	 huge	capabilities	 of	 the	 Norwegian	 merchant	 fleet—in	particular,	 the	offshore	 fleet	on	 the	one	hand,	and	the	specific	nature	of	the	Norwegian	littorals	on	the	other.	The	credibility	of	these	concepts	rests	on	the	ability	of	 the	Norwegian	armed	forces	to	establish	and	maintain	sea	control	in	the	inner	leads.	In	turn,	this	requires	the	maintenance	and	development	of	the	Norwegian	ability	to	fight	in	the	littorals.		We	 believe	 these	 concepts	 represent	 a	potential	win-win	solution	for	both	Norway	and	the	US.	The	credibility	of	US	reinforcement	of	Norway	in	crisis	or	war	would	be	enhanced.	And	as	Norway	steps	up	to	shoulder	a	larger	part	of	the	burden,	the	US	 would	 be	 able	 to	 transfer	 scarce	 resources	 to	other	tasks.	 1/2019 
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Appendix 1: The NALMEB Agreement of 1981 I	 henhold	 til	 kgl.res.	 16.	 januar	 1981	 ble	 avtalen	undertegnet	 i	 Washington	 D.C.	 samme	 dato.	 Det	vises	 til	 St.prp.nr.61	 (1980–1981),	 Innst.S.nr.139	(1980–1981)	 og	 til	 vedtak	 i	 Stortinget	 13.	 januar	1981.	Avtalen	trådte	i	kraft	16.	januar	1981.	
Memorandum of Understanding Governing 
Prestockage and Reinforcement of Norway The	 Government	 of	 the	 United	 States	 and	 the	Government	of	Norway,	intending	to	strengthen	the	security	 of	 the	 NATO	 area	 through	 enhanced	Alliance	 capability	 for	 reinforcing	 Norway,	 have	agreed:		1.	 That	 the	 United	 States	 may	 provide,	consistent	with	 SACEUR	 requirements	 and	implementing	 arrangements,	 a	 U.S.	Marine	amphibious	 brigade	 (MAB)	 for	 Alliance	reinforcement	of	Norway	within	 the	NATO	chain	of	command.	2.	 The	composition	of	the	Marine	amphibious	brigade	 shall	 include	 infantry	 and	 combat	service	support	as	well	as	aviation,	artillery,	infantry,	and	anti-tank	weapons.	The	Marine	aviation	 combat	 element	 shall	 perform	 air	defence	 and	 close	 air	 support	 missions.	 It	shall	 consist	of	 two	air	defence	squadrons,	two	 close	 support	 squadrons,	 and	appropriate	 support	 aircraft,	 as	 mutually	agreed.	 It	 shall	 consist,	 furthermore,	 of	approximately	75	heavy	transport	and	light	support	helicopters.	3.	 In	order	to	facilitate	the	rapid	transfer	of	the	MAB	 in	 a	 conventional	 Alliance	reinforcement	 of	 Norway,	 the	 following	heavy	equipment	and	supplies	for	the	use	of	that	 MAB	will	 be	 prepositioned	 in	 Central	Norway:	 24	 155-mm	 howitzers	 and	 their	prime	 movers,	 bridging	 equipment,	 motor	transport	 (approximately	 250	 trucks	 with	about	 100	 trailers),	 ammunition,	 fuel,	 and	food.		4.	 With	 respect	 to	air	defence	of	air	bases,	 in	addition	 to	 currently	 planned	 Norwegian	defenses	for	air	fields,	the	United	States	shall	seek	 to	 make	 available	 upon	 favourable	terms	 to	 the	 Government	 of	 Norway	 two	batteries	 of	 I-Hawk	 subject	 to	 the	requirements	of	U.S.	laws	and	regulations.	It	is	 understood	 that	 Norway	 will	 be	responsible	for	operations	and	maintenance	
costs,	to	include	the	cost	of	missiles,	as	well	as	any	costs	of	refurbishing.		5.	 The	 Government	 of	 Norway	 shall	 make	available	adequate	means	to	tactically	 load	and	 transport	personnel	and	equipment	of	the	 Marine	 Amphibious	 Brigade	 from	Central	Norway	to	other	threatened	areas	in	Norway.		6.	 The	 Government	 of	 Norway	 shall,	 through	NATO	 infrastructure	 procedures,	 provide	adequate	 prepositioning	 facilities	 and	airbase	 reception	 facilities	 and	 operating	airbases,	 and	 shall	 assume	 responsibilities	for	 security	 and	 general	 maintenance	 of	prepositioned	 equipment	 and	 supplies	 in	consonance	with	the	provisions	as	outlined	in	Article	10	of	the	memorandum	from	the	Norwegian	 Ministry	 of	 Defense	 to	 major	NATO	commanders	(MNC)	of	11	December	1959.	Financial	arrangements	for	the	cost	of	operations	 and	 maintenance	 will	 be	mutually	agreed.		7.	 In	 the	 event	 that	 the	 Marine	 Amphibious	Brigade	 should	 be	 transferred	 to	 other	threatened	areas	in	Norway,	it	will	draw	on	Norwegian	 stocks	 of	 available	 “common	user”	items	such	as	munitions,	food,	and	fuel	to	 allow	 time	 for	 establishing	 of	 U.S.	logistical	support.	8.	 The	 Government	 of	 Norway	 shall	 make	available	 host	 nation	 support	 for	 the	MAB	including	some	150	over-snow	vehicles,	two	motor	 transport	 companies	 (90	 trucks	each),	 one	 ambulance	 company	 (35	ambulances),	 one	 refueler	 section	 (6	trucks),	 and	 necessary	 engineering	 and	airbase	 support	 equipment	 as	 mutually	agreed.	9.	 The	Government	of	the	United	States	agrees	to	 accept	 Norwegian	 rules	with	 respect	 to	ownership,	 control,	 and	 access	 to	infrastructure	 installations	 as	 outlined	 in	Article	 10	 of	 the	 memorandum	 from	 the	Norwegian	Ministry	of	Defense	to	MNC's	of	11	December	1959.	10.	 Norwegian	 policies	 with	 respect	 to	 the	stationing	 of	 foreign	 troops	 on	 Norwegian	territory	and	the	stockpiling	or	deployment	of	nuclear	weapons	on	Norwegian	territory	will	not	be	altered	by	this	agreement.	11.	 This	arrangement	is	subject	to	amendment	by	agreement	of	the	parties.	
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12.	 This	 Memorandum	 of	 Understanding	 shall	enter	 into	 force	on	 the	day	of	 signature.	 It	shall	 continue	 in	 force	 until	 terminated	by	one	year's	notice	by	either	party.		Washington,	D.C.,	February	16,	1981.		
Appendix 2: The MCPP-MOU from 2006 Signed	 June	 8,	 2005,	 approved	 in	 Parliament	December	 19,	 2006,	 in	 force	 from	 February	 27,	2007.	
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
Governing Prestokage and Reinforcement of 
Norway10 The	Government	of	the	Kingdom	of	Norway	and	the	Government	 of	 the	 United	 States	 of	 America,	hereinafter	referred	to	collectively	as	“the	Parties”	and	individually	as	“Party”;	- Committed	to	strengthening	the	security	of	the	North	Atlantic	Treaty	Organization	and	enhancing	operational	responsiveness;	- Taking	 into	 account	Article	 5	 of	 the	North	Atlantic	Treaty;	and	- Recalling	 the	 Agreement	 between	 the	Parties	 to	 the	 North	 Atlantic	 Treaty	Regarding	the	Status	of	Their	Forces,	done	at	London	on	June	19,	1951;		Have	agreed	as	follows:		1.		 The	 Government	 of	 the	 United	 States	 will	provide,	 consistent	 with	 U.S.	 Secretary	 of	Defense	 requirements	 and	 implementing	agreements,	a	Marine	Corps	Prepositioning	Program	in	Norway	(MCPP-N).	2.		 The	MCPP-N	will	support	the	reinforcement	of	 Norway,	 as	 well	 as	 global	 U.S.	 Marine	Corps	 expeditionary	 operations,	 including	establishment	 of	 forward	 operating	 bases	and	selected	security	cooperation	activities	in	 support	 of	 U.S.	 Regional	 Combatant	Commanders,	 and	 such	 other	 purposes	 as	the	Parties	may	mutually	agree.	3.		 For	 all	 activities	 listed	 in	 paragraph	 2,	 the	Government	of	the	Kingdom	of	Norway	shall	make	 available	 adequate	 means	 to	 load,	transport,	 and	 protect	 equipment	 of	 the	MCPP-N	 from	 Central	 Norway	 to	mutually	agreed	 Norwegian	 sea	 or	 air	 ports	 of	embarkation.	 In	 the	 event	 the	 MCPP-N	 is	used	to	reinforce	Norway,	 the	Government	
of	 the	 Kingdom	 of	 Norway	 shall	 make	available	adequate	means	to	load,	transport,	and	 protect	 equipment	 of	 the	 MCPP-N,	 as	well	 as	 receive,	 stage,	 and	 move	 onward	personnel	and	equipment	to	predesignated	areas	within	Norway.	4.		 The	Government	of	the	Kingdom	of	Norway	shall	 provide	 adequate	 prepositioning	facilities,	 airbase	 reception	 facilities,	 and	operating	 air	 bases,	 and	 shall	 assume	responsibility	 for	 security	 and	 general	maintenance	 of	 prepositioned	 equipment	and	supplies.	The	Parties	agree	to	cost-share	such	operations	and	maintenance	expenses	in	support	of	the	MCPP-N.	The	Government	of	the	Kingdom	of	Norway	contribution	will	be	limited	to	half	of	the	total	costs	incurred	or	 the	 ceiling	 set	 in	 U.S.	 dollars	 to	 be	negotiated	by	the	Parties,	whichever	is	less.	Any	expenses	to	be	paid	by	the	Parties	will	be	 agreed	 to	 in	 advance,	 subject	 to	 the	respective	 laws	 of	 each	 Party.	 As	appropriate,	logistics	supplies,	support,	and	services	may	be	provided	under	the	Mutual	Logistics	Support	Agreement	of	August	20,	1982,	as	amended.	5.		 In	the	event	of	the	reinforcement	of	Norway,	the	Government	of	the	Kingdom	of	Norway	shall	make	available	host	nation	support	for	the	MCPP-N,	 including	over-snow	vehicles,	motor	 transport	 assets,	 medical	 support,	refueling	 capability	 for	 ground	 equipment	and	 aviation	 assets,	 and	 necessary	engineering	and	airbase	support	equipment	as	 mutually	 agreed.	 MCPP-N	 will	 draw	 on	Norwegian	 stocks	 of	 available	 “common	user”	 items,	 such	 as	 munitions,	 food,	 and	fuel,	 to	allow	time	 for	 the	establishment	of	U.S.	logistical	support.	6.		 Consistent	 with	 paragraph	 7,	 the	Government	of	the	United	States	of	America	confirms	Norwegian	ownership	and	control	of	 the	 prepositioning	 facilities	 and	installations	that	are	the	subject	of	this	MOU.	7.		 The	 Government	 of	 the	 United	 States	 of	America	 shall	 retain	 ownership	 of	 all	Prepositioned	 stocks	 of	 the	 MCPP-N,	 and	may	withdraw	such	stocks	from	the	MCPP-N	pursuant	 to	 paragraph	1	 in	 consultation	with	the	Government	of	Norway.	8.		 Norwegian	 policies	 with	 respect	 to	 the	stationing	 of	 foreign	 troops	 on	 Norwegian	territory	and	the	stockpiling	or	deployment	
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of	nuclear	weapons	on	Norwegian	territory	will	 not	 be	 altered	 by	 this	 MOU.	 The	Government	of	the	United	States	of	America	will	 respect	 Norwegian	 international	 legal	obligations	with	regard	to	the	stockpiling	of	certain	 types	 of	 weapons	 on	 Norwegian	territory.	9.		 This	 MOU	 is	 subject	 to	 amendment	 by	mutual	written	agreement	of	the	Parties.	As	appropriate,	 the	 Parties	 may	 enter	 into	Implementing	 Agreements	 or	Arrangements	to	carry	out	the	provisions	of	this	MOU.	Activities	covered	by	this	MOU	are	subject	 to	 the	 availability	 of	 funds,	appropriated	for	such	purposes.	10.		 This	MOU	supersedes	 the	Memorandum	of	Understanding	 Governing	 Prestockage	 and	Reinforcement	 of	 Norway,	 between	 the	Government	of	the	Kingdom	of	Norway	and	the	 Government	 of	 the	 United	 States	 of	America,	 signed	 in	 Washington,	 D.C.	 on	January	 16,	 1981.	 The	 Parties	 confirm	 the	application	 of	 the	 Agreement	 between	 the	Parties	 to	 the	 North	 Atlantic	 Treaty	
Regarding	the	Status	of	Their	Forces,	signed	June	 19,	 1951,	 to	 all	 activities	 conducted	pursuant	to	the	MCPP-N	and	this	MOU.	This	MOU	 shall	 enter	 into	 force	 on	 the	 date	 on	which	the	Parties	have	informed	each	other	through	diplomatic	channels	that	they	have	fulfilled	 their	 respective	 internal	requirements	 necessary	 to	 bring	 it	 into	force.	 It	 shall	 continue	 in	 force	 until	terminated	by	one	year's	written	notice	by	either	Party	to	the	other	through	diplomatic	channels.		In	 witness	 whereof,	 the	 undersigned,	 duly	authorized	by	 their	 respective	Governments,	 have	signed	this	MOU.		Done	in	duplicate	at	Stavanger	this	8th	day	of	June,	2005.											
1 COB – Colocated Operating Base.  
2 See Milan Vego, Naval strategy and operations in narrow 
seas, (2003) 
3 Kjell Sørli, Fra krise til konsensus. Marinens anskaffelser og 
krigspålagte oppgaver 1950-1960, (Forsvarsstudier no. 2, 
Institutt for forsvarstudier, Oslo, 2000). Downloaded from 
https://fhs.brage.unit.no/fhs-
xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/99715/FS0200.pdf?sequenc
e=1&isAllowed=y September 2019. 
4 USMC Prepositioning Handbook, 3rd Edition, 2015, Table I, 
I-5.  
5 For Exercise Trident Juncture 2018, two ro-ro vessels 
brought in 450 pieces of rolling stock and containers from 
the US and Germany. The M/V Resolve is 190 meters long 
with a beam of almost 33 meters. See “ARC Discharges 
Army and Marine Corps Cargo in Norway for Operation 
Trident Juncture” ARC homepages September 25, 2018. 
Downloaded from https://www.arcshipping.com/news/arc-
discharges-army-and-marine-corps-cargo-in-norway-for-
operation-trident-juncture/ 
6 Hopefully, Norway will be able to establish credible air 
defense over key areas in Trøndelag and Troms counties.  
					
The AD system in Trøndelag may cover the sea port of 
embarkation as well as the air bases in Værnes and Ørland. 
The AD system in Troms may cover the sea ports of 
debarkation, depending on the mission and objectives. 
7 The research project, Seapower 2040, is ongoing at the 
Royal Norwegian Naval Academy. Reports on the 
development of the Russian Navy in general, and the 
Northern fleet in particular, will be published in the spring 
of 2020.  
8 For examples from four different companies, see 
https://www.solstad.com/fleet/ 
http://www.dof.no/Files/PDF/DOF%20Group/Media/DOF_fl
eet_booklet_web.pdf 
http://www.siemoffshore.com/Default.aspx?ID=172 
https://www.boa.no/vessels/  
9 This is discussed in RNoN’s Concept Paper Series 1/2019, 
“Bridging the Atlantic.” 
10 The Treaty is located here: 
https://lovdata.no/dokument/TRAKTATEN/traktat/2005-06-
08-101 
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